TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/040389/04038900.043

Text File | 1992-09-23 | 7.9 KB | 152 lines

                                                                                NATION, Page 16

A Choice of Arms


Does the U.S. really need a new nuclear missile?

By Bruce Van Voorst


    It could be the most momentous national-security decision
that George Bush ever makes. In early April the President must
choose a multibillion-dollar plan for modernizing the nation's
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Though dozens
of basing modes and several new missiles have been considered,
only two expensive mobile missile systems are really in the
running: the rail-carried, multiwarhead MX and the
truck-transported, single-warhead Midgetman. Bush's wisest
course might be to deploy neither one.

    The President's deliberations will be guided by the concept
that has been the basis of U.S. nuclear deterrence for more
than 30 years: that enough American weapons must survive a
Soviet surprise attack to guarantee a devastating retaliatory
strike. Pursuing that strategy, the U.S. has built a formidable
triad of strategic nuclear forces: land-based ICBMs in silos,
sea-based missiles aboard submarines, and nuclear bombs carried
by airplanes. But over the years, the increased accuracy of
Soviet ICBMs has gradually threatened the land-based leg of the
triad, which consists of 450 Minuteman IIs, each carrying a
single warhead; 500 Minuteman IIIs tipped with three warheads;
and 50 more modern MX's, each with ten warheads. The
Administrations of Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan
considered 30 or so ideas for rendering U.S. ICBMs less
vulnerable to Soviet attack. But as a report co-authored by
former Defense Secretary Harold Brown noted, all the proposals
were rejected because they failed the basic criteria of being
"militarily effective, affordable and politically acceptable."

    As Bush makes up his mind, skeptical strategic experts are
challenging the fundamental assumption: that land-based
missiles are as vulnerable as some other experts fear. There is
considerable doubt that the Soviets could actually attack U.S.
ICBMs with impunity. Studies by the Pentagon suggest that even
if the Soviets aimed two warheads at each U.S. silo, they could
count on destroying only 65% to 80% of the ICBMs. That would
leave at least 400 land-based U.S. warheads -- each packing
about 20 times the destructive force of the Hiroshima bomb --
for a counterattack on the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviets
would always have to fear that the U.S., alerted to a surprise
attack, would simply launch its entire force before enemy
missiles arrived. Says conservative strategist Fred Ikle: "The
Soviets can never have a high confidence of destroying these
missiles in their silos."

    Although many respected observers argue the case, it makes
little sense to worry unduly about the vulnerability of the
land-based leg of the triad when it accounts for only 20% of
the 12,000 warheads in America's strategic nuclear arsenal. Even
in the unlikely event that a first strike wiped out the entire
American land-based missile force, the U.S. could still
obliterate the Soviet Union with a fraction of the 5,300
warheads on its modern missile submarines and the 4,700 on its
bombers. Though the first operational test last week of a
Trident II missile resulted in a spectacular pinwheeling
explosion, that failure was at worst a temporary setback for a
weapon that will give the U.S. a sea-based silo-killing
capability for the first time. In fact, it is the Soviet Union,
not the U.S., that has a real problem with the survivability of
its nuclear forces, since as many as 55% of its warheads are
concentrated in vulnerable land-based silos. That explains why
Moscow has developed the rail-mobile SS-24, which carries ten
warheads, and the truck-carried SS-25 single-warhead missile.

    Logic, unfortunately, does not always dictate strategic
decisions. Irrational as the fear of a Soviet surprise attack
may be, psychological and political reasons alone may push the
U.S. into proceeding with a new mobile missile. As one
congressional expert put it, "You can't debate survivability for
a decade and then not do anything." It is unlikely that the
Senate would ratify a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that
allowed the Soviets mobile missiles unless the U.S. first
decided to acquire a comparable system.

    The critical question thus becomes which of the missiles to
buy. The ten-warhead MX, which Reagan dubbed the Peacekeeper,
is a proven, highly accurate ICBM. In one option, the 50 MX's
already deployed in ICBM silos would be supplemented by another
50 "garrisoned" on special railroad cars stationed on military
bases. If a U.S.-Soviet confrontation loomed, the missiles would
be moved out on 180,000 miles of railway across the nation. The
main advantage of this scheme is its relatively low price tag:
an estimated $12 billion for 50 missiles carrying 500 warheads.
A somewhat cheaper option ($8 billion) would shift the existing
silo-based MX's to railroad flatcars.

    The single-warhead Midgetman (a misnomer for a missile
weighing 37,000 lbs.) would sidestep the vulnerability problem
by being deployed on hardened, tractor-drawn launchers. In times
of crisis, the launchers could be dispersed over thousands of
square miles on and off military reservations. But while
military planners consider the Midgetman more survivable in a
surprise attack than the MX, it is much more expensive: $39
billion for 500 missiles carrying 500 warheads.

    The choice between the two missiles must take into account
the projected overall ceiling of 4,900 land- and sea-based
ballistic-missile warheads that has been set in the START
negotiations. With smaller numbers of warheads on both sides,
there is a strategic advantage in single-warhead missiles like
Midgetman. By dispersing its quota of warheads on a larger
number of Midgetman missiles instead of concentrating it on a
smaller number of MX's, the U.S. could greatly complicate a
Soviet first strike.

    Such logic argues powerfully for the Midgetman if and when
the U.S. modernizes its ICBM force. But the odds are that the
Administration will propose building at least some of both new
missiles. Bush will argue that the MX is a tested weapon that
can be speedily deployed on railcars to deal with the problem
of vulnerability. But given strong Democratic support for the
Midgetman, he will have to accept that system as well.

    Congress is likely to go along with the compromise, though
a heated debate over numbers and timing will ensue. The
controversy will involve claims that deploying the new missiles
so diminishes the threat of a surprise Soviet attack that the
Strategic Defense Initiative is unnecessary. Some SDI supporters
will argue for delaying new missile deployment in the
expectation of major breakthroughs in Star Wars.

    In the rush to judgment, both the President and Congress
are missing an opportunity to trump Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev's arms-control ideas. Soviet multiwarhead SS-18s pose
the principal threat to American ICBMs. It might be easier to
reduce the threat by negotiating further cutbacks in Soviet
missiles than by building new U.S. weapons. Under START, SS-18s
would be cut 50%. Still more reductions could be sought in
return for a U.S. agreement to refrain from deploying more MX's.
Efforts could also be made to dissuade the Soviets from further
deployment and upgrading of their ten-warhead SS-24, possibly
in exchange for a U.S. offer to hold off on the Midgetman or cut
back on silo MX's. While these ideas are being explored,
strategic decisions should be based on the same maxim that is
supposed to guide physicians: "First, do no harm."

    Opting for both Midgetman and rail MX would be the worst
possible resolution of an ICBM survivability problem that may
not exist. For the U.S., there may be more to gain through
imaginative negotiating than from forging ahead with new ICBMs.